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Abstract 
 
We examine whether board connections through shared directors influence firm disclosure 
policies. To overcome endogeneity challenges, we focus on an event that represents a significant 
change in firm disclosure policy: the cessation of quarterly earnings guidance. Our research design 
allows us to exploit the timing of director interlocks and therefore differentiate the director 
interlock effect on disclosure policy contagion from alternative explanations, such as endogenous 
director-firm matching or strategic board stacking. We find that firms are more likely to stop 
providing quarterly earnings guidance if they share directors with previous guidance stoppers. 
We also find that director-specific experience from prior guidance cessations matters for 
disclosure policy contagion. The positive effect of interlocked directors on the likelihood of 
quarterly earnings guidance cessation is particularly strong for firms with interlocked directors who 
experienced positive outcomes from prior guidance cessation decisions. Overall, our evidence is 
consistent with interlocked directors serving as conduits for information sharing that leads to the 
spread of corporate disclosure policies. 
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1 Introduction 
Prior studies show that corporate practices spread through director networks. Bizjak, 
Lemmon, and Whitby (2009), for example, report that firms with boards interlocked to 
backdating firms are more likely to backdate employee stock options. Brown (2011) shows that 
firms are more likely to adopt corporate-owned life insurance as a tax shelter if they have boards 
linked to other firms that have adopted such shelters. More recently, Chiu, Teoh, and Tian (2013) 
find evidence of earnings management contagion in firms with interlocked boards. These studies 
support the notion that social networks, such as board interlocks, facilitate the exchange of 
information and the spread of corporate practices across firms. Not all corporate practices, 
however, diffuse in the same way (Davis and Greve 1997). 
We examine whether firm disclosure policy spreads from one firm to another through shared 
directors. Specifically, we investigate the contagion of quarterly earnings guidance cessation. 
Contagion of disclosure policy through director interlocks might present patterns that differ distinctly 
from the diffusion of other corporate practices for several reasons. First, because firms’ disclosure 
policies tend to be “sticky” (Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller 2003; Skinner 2003; Graham, Harvey, 
and Rajgopal 2005), the effect of board interlocks on firms’ disclosure policies could be limited. 
Second, unlike the adoption of corporate actions examined in prior studies (e.g., option backdating, 
earnings management, tax shelters, etc.), guidance cessation represents the decommitment of existing 
corporate practice for which director learning might work differently. Third, information demand 
from outside constituents such as financial analysts and institutional investors may weaken disclosure 
policy contagion through interlocked directors. Fourth, divergences in the information environment 
and differences in the costs and benefits of voluntary disclosures across firms may affect how 
knowledge and experience spread to other firms in the director network. 
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Prior studies are inconclusive about the influence of directors on corporate disclosure 
policy. Richardson, Tuna, and Wysocki (2005) examine director fixed effects on disclosure policy 
and conclude that their results are more consistent with directors and firms matching their policy 
preferences than with directors imposing their policy preferences on firms. Because of inherent 
endogeneity challenges, it is difficult to establish a causal relation between interlocked directors 
and disclosure policy based on panel data. In this paper, we take an event study approach and focus 
on an event that represents a significant change in firm disclosure policy: the cessation of quarterly 
earnings guidance. We exploit the timing of director interlocks to tease out causality and therefore 
differentiate the director interlock effect on disclosure policy contagion from alternative 
explanations such as endogenous director-firm matching.  
We capture the spread of quarterly earnings guidance cessation via board networks by 
identifying director interlocks when a current director has gained guidance cessation experience 
through serving on the board of another company. For each calendar quarter, we identify guidance 
stoppers as firms that issued quarterly earnings guidance for at least three out of the four pre-event 
quarters but gave no quarterly earnings guidance for any of the four quarters in the post-event period. 
We compare these stoppers with a control sample of guidance maintainers that provided quarterly 
earnings guidance for at least three out of four quarters in both the pre- and post-event periods.  
We find that director interlocks to previous guidance stoppers increase the likelihood of 
quarterly earnings guidance cessation. Furthermore, we find that the positive effect of interlocked 
directors on the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation is particularly strong for firms 
with interlocked directors who experienced positive outcomes from prior guidance cessation 
decisions. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to document that the outcome-
specific experience directors gained from previous disclosure policy changes affects disclosure 
policy contagion. The influence of audit committee directors on the contagion of guidance 
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cessation appears to be greater than that of non-audit committee directors, but the difference is 
not statistically significant. 
Studies on social networks are vulnerable to the question of causal interpretation (Stuart and 
Yim 2010). To ensure that the observed disclosure policy contagion via board interlocks is not an 
artifact of endogenous director-firm matching or strategic board stacking, we conduct an array of 
additional analyses by exploring the timing of directors’ appointments and departures. Our results do 
not support these alternative explanations. Overall, the evidence is consistent with firm disclosure 
policies spreading through interlocked directors, who carry their experience of quarterly earnings 
guidance cessation to the other directorships they hold.1 
Our study contributes to the accounting and finance literature as well as the social network 
literature. A growing body of research (e.g., Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008; Bizjak et al. 2009; 
Stuart and Yim 2010; Brown 2011; Cai and Sevilir 2012; Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons 2012) 
examines the role of board networks in corporate financial policy. We show that knowledge and 
experience gained through director networks also influence firm disclosure policy, especially 
decisions on quarterly earnings guidance cessation. Other studies (Feng and Koch 2010; Houston, 
Lev, and Tucker 2010; Chen, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal 2011) show that firm characteristics influence 
guidance cessation decisions. We extend this literature by examining whether the inter-firm network 
of directors affects the diffusion of guidance cessations and by demonstrating that director networks 
serve as conduits for information that influences corporate disclosure policies.  
                                                 
1 Disclosure policy also may spread across firms through public channels instead of social networks. Houston et al. (2010) 
find that, of 222 stoppers over 2002-2005, only 26 firms (11.7%) publicly announce their policy changes. Because only a 
few guidance stoppers publicly announce and rationalize their decision to stop providing quarterly guidance and the 
majority just cease to provide guidance, we believe that information spillover through public channels cannot explain our 
results. In addition, we find that director-specific experience from prior cessation is important for disclosure policy 
contagion, which cannot be explained by spillover through public channels. Our results are robust to the exclusion of firms 
whose board members are connected to previous stoppers that publicly announce their guidance cessation decisions. The 
results are also robust to controlling for the potential ripple effect of the widely publicized Coca-Cola’s guidance cessation 
announcement on December 13, 2002. 
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Our paper is also related to Chiu et al. (2013), who examine the effect of director 
interlocks on discretionary financial reporting choices. While they study the contagion of 
earnings management through the director network, we offer evidence on the spread of firm 
disclosure policy via interlocked directors. Furthermore, we also examine the effect of director-
specific experience. We show that interlocked directors’ outcome-specific experience affects 
disclosure policy contagion.     
Two recent papers examine executive fixed effects on firm disclosure policy. Bamber, Jiang, 
and Wang (2010) find that top executives exhibit unique styles in their firms’ voluntary disclosure 
choices. Brochet, Fraurel, and McVay (2011) find that firms’ quarterly earnings guidance policy is 
associated with top executive turnovers. Although our paper is related to these studies as we also 
investigate the role of executives/directors, as opposed to firm-, industry-, or market-level 
characteristics, in explaining firm disclosure policy, there are important differences. First, while 
earlier studies rely on executive turnover to identify manager fixed effects, we focus on director 
interlocks through board networks to isolate the effects of experience and information sharing. 
Second, manager fixed effects, as documented in Bamber et al. (2010), capture the long-lasting 
impacts of managers’ early-life experience. We show that the relatively recent experience that 
executives/directors gained from their directorships at previous stoppers also influences their 
voluntary disclosure decisions. Our paper complements earlier studies by offering new evidence on 
how individuals influence firm disclosure behavior. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
research design. Section 3 develops our hypotheses. Section 4 presents our main results. Section 
5 provides additional analyses, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
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Quarterly earnings guidance is a widespread, yet highly controversial, disclosure practice 
among public companies. On the one hand, managers can provide earnings forecasts to guide analysts’ 
expectations within a reasonable range to avoid large earnings surprises and high stock volatility 
(Ajinkya and Gift 1984), enhance investor confidence in managers’ ability (Trueman 1986), decrease 
information asymmetry and cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991, Lang and Lundholm 1993, 
Coller and Yohn 1997, Easley and O’Hara 2004), and reduce litigation risks (Skinner 1994, 1997). On 
the other hand, quarterly earnings guidance may encourage myopic managerial behavior at the cost of 
long-term growth when managers attempt to meet or beat the guided quarterly earnings numbers 
(Kasznik 1999, Houston et al. 2010, Chen et al. 2011). Over the last two decades, firms have come 
under increasing pressure to end the practice of providing quarterly earnings guidance from regulators 
(Levitt 2000), the CFA Institute (Krehmeyer and Orsagh 2006), the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
(2007), and prominent investors such as Warren Buffet (1996). 
However, cessation of quarterly earnings guidance, which represents a significant shift in 
firm disclosure policy, is a very difficult decision. Disclosure theories suggest that managers 
have incentive not to disclose unfavorable information (Verrecchia 1983, Dye 1985). Market 
participants may interpret the cessation of earnings guidance as a sign of weak firm performance. 
Consistent with this view, recent evidence suggests that firms that stop offering quarterly 
earnings guidance tend to have poor prior performance and, on average, experience negative 
consequences, such as increases in analyst forecast error and forecast dispersion (Houston et al. 
2010, Chen et al. 2011).   
Managers confronted with this difficult decision may seek advice from others who have dealt 
with similar problems successfully in the recent past. One convenient source of advice comes from 
board members who also serve as directors at other companies that have recently stopped quarterly 
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earnings guidance. These directors can help managers with this decision by sharing their experiences 
at other firms and providing first-hand expertise in evaluating the disclosure policy change.  
We argue that interlocked directors serve as conduits for information that can lead to the 
spread of corporate disclosure policies. The large network of interlocked directors creates 
channels through which private information flows. More information reduces outcome 
uncertainty and interlocked directors’ first-hand experience reduces ambiguity. In addition, 
whether a firm changes its disclosure policy depends on the perceived costs and benefits of the 
change. Directors serving on the boards of other firms that have changed their disclosure policies 
may have biased estimates of the potential costs and benefits of the change. In particular, they 
are likely to underestimate the costs and overestimate the benefits.2 As a result, we expect board 
interlocks to other firms that previously stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance to 
increase the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation. 
We expect cross-sectional variation in disclosure policy contagion through the director 
network. Interlocked directors would be more (less) likely to transmit information if they 
experienced positive (negative) consequences of quarterly earnings guidance cessation at 
previous stoppers. Interlocked directors are also more likely to influence the focal firm’s 
disclosure policy changes when they are the chair or a member of the audit committee, which 
oversees financial reporting. 
 
3 Data and research design 
3.1 Sample of guidance stoppers and maintainers 
                                                 
2 Similarly, in their study of earnings management contagion, Chiu et al. (2013) argue that “an interlocked director 
observing earnings management in another firm may estimate a lower perceived cost of manipulation and a higher 
perceived benefit, potentially leading to rational herd behavior or information cascades.”   
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Our initial sample of guidance stoppers and maintainers comes from the First Call 
Company Issued Guidelines (CIG) database. We collect quarterly earnings guidance from the 
first quarter of 2001 to the first quarter of 2011. We focus on the post-Reg FD period to eliminate 
the possibility of firms stopping public guidance and replacing it with private guidance.3 We also 
require sample firms to be covered by the RiskMetrics Directors database, which provides 
extensive information on directors of S&P1500 firms and enables us to establish the existence of 
board interlocks.  
Similar to Houston et al. (2010), we refer to each calendar quarter during our sample period 
as an “event quarter,” the preceding four quarters as the “pre-event” period, and the event quarter 
and the subsequent three quarters as the “post-event” period. We exclude quarterly earnings 
guidance issued after the fiscal quarter-end, because these pre-announcements are part of a firm’s 
earnings announcement strategy rather than a guidance strategy. We define guidance stoppers 
based on quarterly guidance as opposed to annual guidance.4 If a firm issued quarterly earnings 
guidance for at least three out of the four pre-event quarters but gave no quarterly earnings 
guidance for any of the four quarters in the post-event period, we classify it as a guidance stopper. 
If a firm provided quarterly earnings guidance for at least three out of the four quarters in both the 
pre- and post-event periods, we define it as a guidance maintainer. For both the stopper and the 
                                                 
3 In October 2000, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Reg FD, which mandates that all publicly 
traded companies must disclose material information to all investors at the same time. Prior to Reg FD, managers often 
provided guidance to financial analysts and institutional investors through private channels. Wang (2007) provides 
evidence that, in the pre-Reg FD period, firms with higher proprietary information costs and more predictable earnings are 
more likely to provide private earnings guidance. Such firms might stop providing public guidance but continue to provide 
private guidance. Because we cannot observe private guidance, we cannot distinguish guidance cessation from replacing 
public guidance with private guidance, and therefore we cannot reliably identify guidance cessation in the pre-FD period. 
In addition, Reg FD changes the information environment. When firms’ strategy for voluntary disclosure is fundamentally 
different between pre- and post-FD periods, applying director learning in the pre-FD period to the post-FD period is 
difficult. Therefore we follow Houston et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2011) and focus on the post-Reg FD period to ensure 
that our sample firms have truly stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance.  
4 Much of the debate centers on quarterly guidance that may motivate managers to engage in myopic behavior. 
Houston et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2011) show that firms stop providing quarterly guidance, but not necessarily 
annual guidance, as a response to the call from critics. 
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maintainer samples, following Houston et al. (2010), we exclude firm-quarters in which the firm is 
delisted (through acquisitions or bankruptcy) in the six quarters beginning with the event quarter to 
avoid the influence of confounding factors associated with delisting.  
For our initial sample of guidance stoppers, we search the Factiva database to ensure that 
they have indeed stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance.5  We find that 89 firms are 
misclassified by CIG as stoppers, while in fact they continued providing quarterly earnings 
guidance in the post-event period. We exclude these firms from the guidance stopper sample. We 
collect stock returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), quarterly accounting 
information from Compustat, analyst coverage from I/B/E/S, and institutional ownership from 
Thomson Financial’s CDA/spectrum 13F. Data from the first quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter 
of 2001 are used as pre-event period data to determine guidance stoppers and maintainers, so we 
exclude them from the final sample. Similarly, data from the third quarter of 2010 to the first 
quarter 2011 are excluded from the final sample because the complete post-event period data are 
unavailable. Our final sample includes 251 guidance stoppers and 882 guidance maintainers with 
event quarters from the first quarter of 2002 to the second quarter of 2010. Following Houston et al. 
(2010), we retain only one observation for each firm during our sample period. For a guidance 
stopper that appears in more than one quarter, we choose its earliest quarter. For a guidance 
                                                 
5 We search for the history of earnings or revenue guidance for all stoppers from a year before to a year after the 
event quarter. We search by keywords in the full texts of Business Wire, PR Newswire, Associated Press 
Newswires, and Reuters Significant Developments. The phrases used include two sets of keywords: (1) guidance, 
outlook, see(s), expect(s), expectation, forecast(s), project(s), estimate(s), higher, and lower; and (2) net, earnings, 
income, results, loss, gain, profit(s), improvement, better, performance, revenue(s), and sales. All keywords, except 
guidance, outlook, and expectation, are used in Kim et al. (2008).  
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maintainer that appears in more than one quarter, we randomly choose a quarter from the qualified 
quarters as this firm’s event quarter.6 
 
3.2 Board interlock measure 
 The key variable in our study is Interlock, which indicates whether a firm is interlocked 
through a shared director with another firm that has previously stopped giving quarterly earnings 
guidance. For each firm-quarter observation in our sample, we use the RiskMetrics Director database 
to track the list of directors on its board in the years prior to the event quarter. We define a firm as 
having stopper interlocks if any of its directors also served on the board of another firm that stopped 
providing quarterly guidance during the two-year period prior to the event quarter. In other words, 
Interlock = 1 when any director of our sample firm served on the board of another company that 
stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance at any point in the previous two years.7 
 Since the interlock measure requires us to know whether a firm is interlocked with guidance 
stoppers in the previous two years, we cannot identify any stopper interlocks for sample firms in 
2002 and 2003. Therefore, our interlock measure starts from year 2004. Table 1 presents the calendar 
year-quarter distribution of guidance stoppers and maintainers. Between the first quarter of 2004 and 
the second quarter of 2010, there are 191 guidance stoppers, among which 52 (27.2%) are 
interlocked with previous stoppers through shared directors. During the same period, 702 firms 
                                                 
6 While the earliest stopper quarters are evenly distributed across sample years, the earliest maintainer quarters are 
concentrated in earlier sample years. To better match the time-series distribution of sample and control firm quarters, 
we randomly draw maintainer quarters. Our results are robust if we use the earliest quarter of maintainers. 
7 Our Interlock measure is similar to the PE Interlock measure in Stuart and Yim (2010), who examine the role of 
board interlocks in change-in-control transactions in the private equity industry. The difference is that they use a 
five-year window in defining interlocks, while we use a two-year window. We choose a shorter window in defining 
interlocks because of our shorter sample period. As a robustness check, we also try a three-year window, and our 
results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. 
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maintain their quarterly earnings guidance, and 79 (11.3%) of them have board interlocks with 
previous stoppers.  
 
3.3 Research design 
To examine the effect of board interlocks on the decision to stop quarterly earnings 
guidance, we estimate the following probit model: 
 
 Pr (Stopper = 1) = Φ (α + β Interlock + Σ γ Controls + ε )           (1) 
 
where the dependent variable Stopper is an indicator variable that equals one for guidance stoppers 
and zero for maintainers, and Φ (·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution. The variable of interest is Interlock. Our primary hypothesis is β > 0, as board 
members’ past guidance cessation experience positively affects the likelihood of guidance 
cessation for the other firms on whose boards they also serve. All variables are defined in the 
appendix. 
We control for a number of firm characteristics that may affect firm disclosure policies. For 
example, Chen et al. (2011) find that guidance stoppers have poorer prior performance, more uncertain 
operating environments, and fewer informed investors. Houston et al. (2010) also find that poor 
performance is the main reason for quarterly earnings guidance cessation. Following Chen et al. (2011), 
we control for firm performance, information environment, informed investors, and litigation risk.8 Our 
first measure of firm performance is market-adjusted buy-and-hold stock returns (BHRET) in the 
one-year period prior to the event quarter. Our second performance measure is the change in the 
percentage of meeting or beating analyst estimates (∆PMBAF).  
                                                 
8 Our control variables closely follow those in Chen et al. (2011). Our results are qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar if we instead control for the same set of variables in Houston et al. (2010).  
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 Disclosure theories (Dye 1985, Jung and Kwon 1988) suggest that managers will disclose 
less in more uncertain environments. Following Chen et al. (2011), we construct two proxies of 
information uncertainty: the change in the standard deviation of daily stock returns (∆STDret) 
and the change in the analyst forecast dispersion (∆DISP). Informed investors also could affect a 
firm’s disclosure policy (Dye 1998). With more informed investors who have knowledge about the 
manager’s information endowment, the manager is less able to pass off nondisclosure as the result 
of no information (Chen et al. 2011). Jiambalvo, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2002) show that 
firms with a larger analyst following and higher institutional ownership are more likely to have 
informed investors. Therefore we control for the change in analyst following (∆AF) and the change 
in the percentage of institutional ownership (∆PINST).  
 A common reason that firms cite for stopping quarterly earnings guidance is to refocus 
investor attention on long-run performance (e.g., Coca-Cola Co. 2002). If a firm has a growing 
long-horizon shareholder base, its management will be more inclined to stop providing quarterly 
earnings guidance to cater to the interests of long-term investors. Alternatively, firms that are 
losing long-horizon shareholders may have greater incentives to stop quarterly earnings guidance 
to attract long-horizon shareholders. Following Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) and Watts and Zuo 
(2012), we classify dedicated institutions and quasi-indexers as long-horizon investors based on 
Bushee’s (1998) classification and control for the change in long-term institutional ownership 
(∆LTPINST).9 
 Litigation risk could limit firms’ incentives to provide voluntary disclosures (Rogers and Van 
Buskirk 2009). Alternatively, firms with a higher likelihood of being sued may be more inclined to 
                                                 
9As a robustness check, we also use public pension funds as a proxy for long-term investors because pension funds 
tend to have longer investment horizons and often monitor firms more actively than other investors (Smith 1996, 
Gillan and Starks 2000, Gompers and Metrick 2001, Qiu 2006, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach 2009). Our results are 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar with this alternative proxy. 
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provide earnings guidance to mitigate litigation risk and accompanying cost (Skinner 1994, 1997). 
We measure litigation risk (LITIGATION) with the estimated probability of being sued by 
shareholders, using the litigation exposure model in Tucker (2007) and Houston et al. (2010).10  
 Prior research also shows that both firm size and growth opportunities are related to a firm’s 
disclosure policy. We control for firm size (LNMV) and growth opportunities (LNMB). Because firms’ 
past guidance behavior could affect the cessation decision, we follow Chen et al. (2011) and include the 
number of quarterly earnings guidance made through quarter t-1 (LNCT). Furthermore, firms that 
initiate quarterly earnings guidance as a result of Reg FD may be more likely to cease providing 
guidance (Chen et al. 2011); therefore we include an indicator variable, REGFD, which equals one if 
the firm’s first quarterly earnings guidance in the CIG database appears after the passage of Reg FD.  
 We also control for the potential effects of executive turnover and board structure on firm 
disclosure policy. Brochet et al. (2011) find that firms’ quarterly earnings guidance policy is associated 
with CEO and CFO turnover, and thus we control for these variables. Firms with similar corporate 
governance structures may hire from the same pool of directors, and they are also more likely to 
engage in similar disclosure behaviors. We rely on the literature of board composition to identify 
factors that could affect the matching between directors and firms. We include board size, average 
board tenure, average director age, and the percentage of independent directors to account for 
board monitoring and advising (Raheja 2005; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2008; Linck, Netter, and 
Yang 2008). We also include a CEO=Chairman indicator to proxy for the balance of power 
between the CEO and the board and CEOs’ stock ownership to control for the level of agency 
conflict between firm managers and shareholders. 
 
                                                 
10 For more information about this litigation risk model, see Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson (2001); Rogers and 
Stocken (2005); and Houston et al. (2010), Appendix 2. 
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3.4 Summary statistics 
 Table 2 Panel A summarizes our sample. Among the 893 firm-quarter observations, 21 
percent are guidance stoppers, and 15 percent have board members serving at another firm that 
stopped quarterly earnings guidance in the past two years. On average, our sample firms have a 
market value of five billion dollars, with a market-to-book ratio of 3.26. The average board has 
nine directors, approximately 73 percent of whom are independent. The directors are, on 
average, 60 years old with board tenures of nine years. In 70 percent of our sample firms, the 
CEO also serves as the chairman. CEOs hold approximately 2.25 percent of the firms’ common 
shares, on average. Variables that measure interlocked directors’ experience at the previous 
stopper are available for only the 131 firm-quarter observations with interlocked directors. While 
the mean values of changes in analyst forecast dispersion and forecast error are negative, the 
median values are positive, suggesting wide variations across firm-quarter observations. Analyst 
following decreases, on average, after the guidance cessation at previous stoppers, while return 
volatility changes little. 
 In Panel B of Table 2, we compare the subsamples of 191 stoppers and 702 maintainers. 
Stoppers are more than twice as likely to have stopper-interlocked directors as maintainers. On 
average, stoppers are larger firms with bigger boards and a lower fraction of CEOs serving as 
chairman. Stoppers experience inferior performance in the previous year compared to 
maintainers, as seen in the negative market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns, deteriorating EPS, 
and a decline in the percentage of meeting or beating earnings expectations. In addition, while 
stoppers experience larger increases in analyst forecast dispersion, maintainers experience larger 
increases in analyst coverage and larger decreases in stock return volatility, suggesting that the 
information environment for stoppers deteriorates relative to that for maintainers.   
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4 Empirical results 
4.1 Results from probit regressions 
 Table 3 presents the marginal effects from probit regressions of the probability that a firm 
stops providing quarterly earnings guidance. We control for year fixed effect and industry fixed 
effect in all regressions. In column 1, we include only the control variables examined in Chen et 
al. (2011) for comparison purposes. We find that poorer stock performance in the year prior to 
the event quarter is associated with a significantly greater likelihood of quarterly earnings 
guidance cessation, consistent with Chen et al. (2011). We also find that in our sample, larger 
firms and firms experiencing an increase in analyst forecast dispersion or a decrease in informed 
investors, proxied by ∆AF, are more likely to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance.  
In column 2, we include only Interlock, the key variable of interest, in the regression. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that Interlock is positively associated with the 
probability of guidance cessation. In column 3, we add control variables. We find that, after 
controlling for firm characteristics, firms with directors interlocked to previous stoppers are 12.5 
percentage points more likely to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance. Given that only 21 
percent of our sample firms are stoppers, the effect is not only statistically but also economically 
significant. The results are consistent with our hypothesis that firms are more likely to stop 
providing quarterly earnings guidance if their directors have served on the boards of other firms 
that stopped quarterly earnings guidance in the recent past.  
Consistent with Brochet et al. (2011), firms are more likely to change their disclosure policies 
after CEO turnover. Among board characteristics, only the CEO=Chairman indicator is significantly 
associated with a lower likelihood of stopping quarterly earnings guidance. Our finding that powerful 
CEOs are less likely to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance is consistent with the notion that 
investors demand more disclosure as a way to monitor powerful CEOs. 
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4.2 Poor performance as a correlated omitted variable 
Prior literature documents that poor performance is the primary reason for stopping 
quarterly earnings guidance (Houston et al. 2010, Chen et al. 2011). Poor performance, if also 
leading to director interlocks, may drive the observed positive relation between stopper 
interlocks and the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation. For example, directors 
may be recruited based on their experience in turnarounds, and director interlocks happen more 
frequently when profits are low (Mizruchi 1996). Although two performance variables (BHRET 
and ∆PMBAF) are already included in the baseline model, we add three more performance 
proxies from Houston et al. (2010): changes in earnings per share in the pre-event period 
(∆EPS), the proportion of loss reporting quarters in the pre-event period (LOSS), and managers’ 
expectation about future operating performance (FutureEPS). All variables are defined in the 
appendix.  
Table 3 Column 4 presents the results with these additional performance controls. Our 
sample size drops to 885 because of missing observations in these variables, but we continue to 
observe a positive and significant relation between Interlock and the probability of guidance 
cessation. To avoid the look-ahead bias in FutureEPS, for subsequent analyses, we report the 
results based on the model without additional performance variables. All results remain 
qualitatively the same if we use the regression model with additional performance variables.11 
 
                                                 
11 We also investigate whether our results are concentrated among firms with poor performance. We add the 
interaction of BHRET and Interlock to our baseline regression. The marginal effect of Interlock remains positive and 
statistically significant after including the interaction term. In addition, the positive relation between Interlock and 
quarterly earnings guidance cessation is not more pronounced for poorly performing firms. If anything, the interlock 
effect is more pronounced for better performing firms, suggesting that poor performance is unlikely to explain the 
director interlock effect. 
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4.3 Director-specific experience 
Intuitively, if interlocked directors’ past experience and knowledge influence the 
likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation for firms on whose boards they also serve, 
we would expect the outcome of interlocked directors’ prior guidance cessation experience to be 
important. For example, if stopper-interlocked directors experienced positive (negative) 
consequences of guidance cessation at previous stoppers, these individuals might have a good 
(bad) lingering taste from their experience, and firms on whose boards they also serve would be 
more (less) likely to take similar actions. Chen et al. (2011) find an increase in analyst forecast 
dispersion and a decrease in forecast accuracy for stoppers but no change in analyst following 
and return volatility. To capture interlocked directors’ guidance cessation experience at previous 
stoppers, we calculate the changes in analyst forecast dispersion, changes in analyst forecast 
error, changes in the number of analyst following, and changes in stock return volatility from the 
pre-event quarters to the post-event quarters around the previous stopper’s quarterly earnings 
guidance cessation. For each of these variables, we create an indicator variable that captures the 
negative post-cessation experience at previous stoppers and let it interact with Interlock. We 
expect firms with interlocked directors who experienced more negative post-cessation outcomes 
at previous stoppers to be less likely to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance than firms 
with interlocked directors who experienced more positive outcomes.  
 Table 4 summarizes our results. We find that the positive effect of stopper-interlocked 
directors on the likelihood of stopping quarterly earnings guidance remains robust. More 
importantly, the stopper interlock effect weakens for firms interlocked to previous stoppers that 
experienced increases in analyst forecast dispersion and analyst forecast error, as the marginal 
effects of the interactions terms, Interlock*Positive ∆(forecast dispersion) and Interlock*Positive 
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∆(forecast error), are both negative and significant.12 We find, however, that experience in terms 
of changes in analyst following and changes in return volatility are not related to the likelihood 
of stopping quarterly earnings guidance, as evidenced by the insignificant marginal effect of 
interactions terms, Interlock*Negative ∆(analyst following) and Interlock*Positive ∆(return 
volatility). It is interesting that two measures, analyst forecast dispersion and analyst forecast 
error, for which prior studies (e.g., Chen et al. 2011) find significant changes after quarterly 
earnings guidance cessation also dictate the influence of interlocked directors’ prior experience 
on the focal firms’ guidance cessation decision. The sum of the coefficient on Interlock and the 
coefficient on Interlock interacted with a proxy for negative experience is insignificant in models 
(1) and (2), indicating that the interlock effect does not exist for firms with interlocked directors 
who experienced an increase in analyst forecast dispersion and an increase forecast error. The sum 
of the coefficients is significantly positive in models (3) and (4).13  
Overall, our results indicate that interlocked directors’ guidance cessation experience at 
previous stoppers, especially in terms of analyst forecast dispersion and analyst forecast error, is 
important for the likelihood of focal firm’s quarterly earnings guidance cessation. Our results are 
quantitatively and qualitatively similar if we instead interact Interlock with high ∆(forecast 
dispersion), high ∆(forecast error), low ∆(analyst following), and high ∆(return volatility), 
                                                 
12 By definition, each of our director-specific experience variables takes the value of zero for all firms with no directors 
interlocked to previous stoppers. The variation of these variables comes from firms with stopper-interlocked directors. The 
interactions of director-specific experience variables and Interlock are therefore the same as the director-specific 
experience variables themselves. For example, the interaction of Positive ∆(forecast dispersion) and Interlock is the same 
as that of Positive ∆(forecast dispersion) itself. The same applies to the variables Tenure<=2yrs and Migrated director in 
Table 8. 
13 We also try excess stock returns of a previous stopper in the year in which it stops issuing guidance, as an 
alternative proxy for negative experience for interlocked directors. Specifically, we calculate market-adjusted 
returns and industry-adjusted returns as well as changes of these returns from the pre-event period. We then include 
a negative-excess-return indicator as well as the interaction of this indicator and Interlock in the regressions. 
Untabulated results show an insignificant coefficient on the interaction of Interlock and each negative excess return 
indicator. This insignificant result is likely due to long-run returns being a noisy proxy for interlocked directors’ 
experience at the previous stopper because of confounding events during the return measurement period. 
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where we define high (low) as an indicator if the value is higher (lower) than the sample median. 
The results in Table 4 thus support our conjecture that interlocked directors’ experience 
influences disclosure policy changes.  
 Because we measure director-specific experience over four post-event quarters, one 
concern is that interlocked directors at the focal firm that stops providing guidance within one 
year from the previous stopper’s guidance cessation may not fully observe the consequences of 
stopping guidance at the previous stopper. To address this concern, we conduct an additional 
analysis in which stopper interlock is activated only for those guidance cessations occurring one 
year after the previous stopper’s guidance cessation. We find that our results (untabulated) are 
robust to this alternative definition of interlock. 
 
4.4 Audit committee directors 
The effect of interlocks through the focal firm’s (or the previous stopper’s) audit committee 
directors may be greater than that of interlocks through non-audit committee directors, because the 
audit committee oversees financial reporting. When a firm has multiple directors interlocked with 
previous stoppers, if any of the interlocked directors is an audit committee member, we consider 
the firm as having an audit committee interlocked director. Table 5 presents the results comparing 
the interlock effect across different types of interlocked directors. In column 1, we focus on 
interlocks through the focal firm’s audit committee versus non-audit committee directors. We find 
that both types of interlocked directors at the focal firm are associated with a greater probability of 
quarterly earnings guidance cessation. The effect of interlocks through the focal firm’s audit 
committee directors appears to be greater than that of interlocks through the focal firm’s non-audit 
committee directors, but the difference is not statistically significant (Likelihood Chi-
square=0.221). In column 3, we examine the effect of board interlocks through previous stoppers’ 
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audit committee versus non-audit committee directors. Again, we find that both types of 
interlocked directors are positively associated with the likelihood of guidance cessation. We also 
examine audit committee chairs and find similar results, as shown in columns 2 and 4. Although 
the marginal effect of interlocked directors who serve as the audit committee chair is twice as large 
as the marginal effect of non-audit committee chair directors, the difference is not statistically 
significant, possibly because of a lack of power, as the number of stopper-interlocked directors 
who serve as the audit committee chair is very small. 
 
4.5 Control for information spillover through public channels 
Houston et al. (2010) find a relatively high frequency of stoppers immediately after Coca-
Cola’s well-publicized guidance cessation announcement on December 13, 2002. Our results are 
not likely to be influenced by Coca-Cola’s announcement, because our stopper interlock measure 
starts from 2004. Nonetheless, we re-estimate our probit regressions after excluding observations 
in the first one, two, or three quarters of 2004 to avoid any ripple effect of Coca-Cola’s guidance 
cessation announcement. Untabulated results resemble those in Table 3. We also replicate 
analyses in Table 4 with the restricted sample and continue to find consistent results indicating 
that interlocked directors’ experience at previous stoppers is important for focal firms’ guidance 
cessation decisions. Thus our evidence is robust to controlling for the ripple effect of Coca-
Cola’s guidance cessation announcement. 
Our results are also robust to the exclusion of firms whose boards are connected to 
previous stoppers that publicly announced their guidance cessation decision. We identify 
guidance cessation announcements by searching the full texts of Business Wire, PR Newswire, 
Associated Press Newswires, and Reuters Significant Developments, as well as conference call 
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transcripts through Factiva. Ten firms in our sample have interlocked directors with previous 
public announcers. Untabulated results from the sample excluding these firms are qualitatively 
and quantitatively similar to those in Tables 3 and 4. Therefore information spillover through the 
public channel cannot explain our results. 
 
4.6 Multiple board interlocks 
In our sample, there are cases where the focal firm is interlocked with multiple previous 
stoppers. Among 131 sample firms interlocked with previous stoppers, 103, 24, 3, and 1 are 
interlocked with one, two, three, and four previous stoppers, respectively. There are also cases 
where the focal firm is interlocked with previous stoppers through multiple directors; 97, 27, 6, 
and 1 out of 131 stopper-interlocked firms are interlocked through one, two, three, and four 
directors, respectively. We examine whether having additional interlocks with previous stoppers 
or having multiple interlocked directors has any incremental impact on the likelihood of 
guidance cessation by adding a multiple-interlock indicator. While the marginal effect of 
Interlock remains positive and significant, we find no evidence that additional interlocks have a 
significant incremental effect, suggesting that it is the existence, rather than the number, of 
stopper interlocks that matters for a firm’s decision to stop providing quarterly earnings 
guidance.14 
 
5 Additional analyses 
5.1 Director-firm matching  
                                                 
14 We also re-estimate our probit regressions by replacing the Interlock indicator with the natural logarithm of (1 + 
number of interlocked stopping firms) or the natural logarithm of (1 + number of stopper-interlocked directors). 
Untabulated results show positive and statistically significant marginal effects of alternative stopper interlock 
variables, consistent with the results in Table 3. 
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 Our empirical findings so far are consistent with our hypothesis that board interlocks 
have an impact on disclosure policy changes. Directors carry their experience of quarterly 
earnings guidance cessation to other directorships they hold, and their knowledge influences the 
guidance cessation decision at other firms whose boards they join. This causal interpretation, 
however, naturally faces some endogeneity challenges. One challenge comes from endogenous 
director-firm matching, as some omitted variables may determine both board composition and 
the guidance cessation decision. For example, firms from the same region, firms in the same 
industry, or firms sharing the same auditors, investors, or analysts are likely to have interlocked 
directors, and they are also likely to provide similar disclosures. In this section, we attempt to 
rule out endogenous director-firm matching as an explanation. 
First, we control for the focal firm’s geographic proximity with all previous stoppers. In 
particular, for each firm-year, we compute a Stopper geographic proximity variable as the natural 
logarithm of (1 + total number of previous stoppers in the same Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA)). MSA data are from the U.S. Census Bureau’s MSA cross-map. Untabulated results 
show that controlling for proximity to previous stoppers does not affect our results. We continue 
to find a positive and significant relation between stopper interlocks and the likelihood of 
guidance cessation. The proxy for stopper proximity is not significantly associated with the 
likelihood of guidance cessation.  
Tse and Tucker (2010) document within-industry herding of earnings warnings. In our 
baseline regressions, we already include industry fixed effects. To further control for industry-
specific effect, we include in our probit regression a Stopper industry activity variable, which is 
defined as the natural logarithm of (1 + number of stoppers in the same Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) industry and in the same MSA), as an additional control variable. 
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Untabulated results show that the positive relation between stopper interlocks and guidance 
cessation is robust to controlling for such an industry-specific effect. The proxy for industry 
trend is not significantly associated with the likelihood of guidance cessation. 
We next consider the impact of sharing auditors, investors, or analysts. Demands from 
common auditors, investors, or analysts could lead firms to make similar corporate decisions on 
director appointments and disclosure policies. Jung (2013), for example, finds that a firm’s 
decision to follow the industry first mover in providing more market-risk disclosures is positively 
associated with an increase in the institutional investor overlap between the two firms. To alleviate 
the concern that demands from overlapping auditors, investors, or analysts are driving the positive 
relation between board interlocks and quarterly earnings guidance cessation, we control for 
overlapping auditors, institutional investors, and analysts. Our proxy for overlapping auditors is the 
natural logarithm of (1 + total number of previous stoppers who share the same-office auditor as 
the focal firm).15 To capture overlapping investors, we compute the average number of overlapping 
institutional investors between the focal firm and all previous guidance stoppers, scaled by the total 
number of institutional investors of the focal firm, both measured in the quarter prior to the event 
quarter. Similarly, our proxy for overlapping analysts is the average number of overlapping 
analysts between the focal firm and all previous guidance stoppers, scaled by the total number of 
analysts of the focal firm in the quarter prior to the event quarter. With controls for auditor, 
investor, and analyst overlap, we continue to find a positive and significant marginal effect of 
Interlock (untabulated), suggesting that our results are robust to controlling for overlapping 
auditors, investors, and analysts.  
                                                 
15  Following Reichelt and Wang (2010), we first identify the city of each auditor from Audit Analytics and 
categorize it by MSA to define same-office auditors. 
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Even after controlling for geographic proximity, industry-level disclosure activity, and 
overlapping auditors, investors, and analysts, endogenous director-firm matching stemming from 
unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics may still drive our results. To address this 
concern, we conduct two more tests by exploiting the timing of director appointments. First, if 
the stopper interlock effect is caused by director-firm matching, conditional on firms being 
matched with specific directors, the timing of the director appointment should not matter. We 
include an indicator variable, Director-firm matching, which equals one if a firm has a director 
who serves on the board of another company that stops providing quarterly earnings guidance at 
any point during our sample period and zero otherwise. If director-firm matching solely explains 
our results, the marginal effect of Interlock should become insignificant once we include the 
Director-firm matching indicator. We find this not true, however. Table 6 Column 1 shows that 
even after controlling for Director-firm matching, the marginal effect of Interlock remains 
positive and statistically significant.   
 Second, we track those directors who depart from a guidance stopper’s board before it 
stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance (Left directors) to determine whether other firms 
whose boards they join have a higher likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation. Figure 1 
Panel A provides an example of Left directors. Because they leave the stopper’s board prior to the 
stopping, these Left directors do not have the knowledge and experience of quarterly earnings 
guidance cessation to transfer to the interlocked focal firms. If knowledge and experience influence 
the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation as we hypothesize, Left directors should 
have no effect on the focal firm’s guidance cessation likelihood. If director-firm matching drives 
the positive relation between stopper interlocks and the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance 
cessation, however, firms that Left directors join would also have a higher likelihood of quarterly 
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earnings guidance cessation, because these directors were once matched to guidance stoppers. 
Column 2 of Table 6 shows that the stopper interlock effect is robust after controlling for Left 
director. In contrast, Left director is not significantly related to the likelihood of quarterly earnings 
guidance cessation.16 Overall, it is unlikely that director-firm matching can explain the positive 
effect of stopper interlocks on the likelihood of stopping quarterly earnings guidance. 
 
5.2 Strategic board stacking 
Another explanation for our findings may be that a firm planning to stop quarterly earnings 
guidance may actively seek out and appoint directors who serve on the boards of other companies 
that have recently done so.17 We find that the average tenure of stopper-interlocked directors in our 
sample is 9.0 years (measured at the time of stopping); interlocked directors with such a long 
tenure are very unlikely to be recruited for the purpose of stopping quarterly earnings guidance. 
Although we believe that strategic board stacking is implausible, we nonetheless address this 
concern in two ways. First, the board stacking effect should come mostly from recently appointed 
directors. If we find a robust interlock effect on quarterly earnings guidance cessation for long-
seated directors, the interlock effect is unlikely to be driven by strategic board stacking. We create 
an indicator variable, Tenure<=2yrs, which equals one if the stopper-interlocked directors have a 
tenure of two years or less and zero otherwise. If a firm has multiple directors interlocked with 
previous stoppers, we define Tenure<=2yrs indicator based on the director with the shortest 
tenure. In our sample, only 23 firm-quarters are associated with stopper-interlocked directors 
whose tenures are two years or shorter. In Table 7 column 1, we include the interaction of 
                                                 
16 The number of observtions with Left Director = 1 is 113. Therefore lack of power is unlikely the cause for the 
insignificant marginal effect of Left Director. 
17 Some stakeholders of the firm (e.g., financial analysts) may oppose stopping quarterly earnings guidance. To 
solidify the argument, managers may seek to appoint directors with guidance cessation experience. 
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Tenure<=2yrs and Interlock. We find that interlocked directors with short tenures are not more 
likely to stop quarterly earnings guidance, and the marginal effect of Interlock continues to show 
up positively and significantly.  
We also follow Stuart and Yim (2010) to examine migrated directors to better understand 
board stacking. Consider the scenarios in Figure 1 Panel B. Firms A, B, and C are interlocked 
through director x, and Firm A is identified as a guidance stopper in year 2003. Arrows refer to the 
tenure of board services, and triangles indicate the years for which Firms B and C have stopper 
interlocks because of Director x’s stopper experience in Firm A in 2003. Firms B and C represent the 
cases of pre-existing director and migrated director, respectively. For Firm B, director x serves on its 
board before Firm A becomes a guidance stopper. Director x, however, joins Firm C’s board in 2004, 
a year after the director acquires guidance cessation experience in Firm A in 2003, and we refer to 
this kind of director as a migrated director. If management plans to soon stop providing quarterly 
earnings guidance, it might recruit migrated directors who have experience with quarterly earnings 
guidance cessation. This board stacking concern is much alleviated in the case of directors who have 
served on the sample firm’s board prior to obtaining any guidance stopping experience (the case of 
firm B). We create an indicator variable, Migrated director, which equals one if the director who 
triggers the stopper interlock joined the focal firm after her stopping experience and zero otherwise. 
For a firm that has multiple directors interlocked with previous stoppers, we define Migrated 
director = 1 if the firm has at least one migrated director. We find that only three firm-quarters in 
our sample are associated with migrated directors. Column 2 of Table 7 shows that migrated 
directors are not more likely to stop quarterly earnings guidance, inconsistent with the notion that 
firms stack up directors with guidance cessation experience to prepare for stopping quarterly earnings 
guidance. More importantly, the marginal effect of the Interlock variable remains positive and 
statistically significant in Table 7, and the magnitude resembles that in the baseline specification in 
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column 3 of Table 3, suggesting that strategic board stacking alone cannot explain the positive 
stopper interlock effect on guidance cessation. 
Board stacking also does not appear to be a common practice used to influence guidance 
decision by our sample firms. Only 23 firm-quarters are associated with stopper-interlocked 
directors who have a tenure of two years or less and only three firm-quarters are associated with 
migrated directors. Low power may have contributed to the insignificant marginal effects of 
those variables. This does not change the main intuition, however; it is unlikely that our results are 
driven by strategic board stacking in firms that plan to stop quarterly earnings guidance. 
 
5.3. Analysis of guidance initiation 
 We also explore whether shared directors influence the initiation of quarterly earnings 
guidance. We focus on initiation of regular quarterly earnings guidance by classifying as a 
guidance initiator a firm that issued no quarterly earnings guidance in the four pre-event quarters 
but issues guidance in at least three out of the four quarters in the post-event period. We search the 
Factiva news database and exclude firms that are misclassified by CIG as initiators from the 
guidance initiator sample. The control sample consists of firms that provide no quarterly earnings 
guidance in both the pre- and post-event periods. We identify 64 guidance initiators and 737 
control firms from the first quarter of 2004 to the second quarter of 2010. We define a firm as 
having initiator interlocks if any of its directors also served on the board of another firm that initiated 
regular quarterly guidance during the two years prior to the event quarter. During our sample period, 
five out of the 64 initiators are interlocked with previous initiators through shared directors, and 54 
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out of the 737 non-initiators have board interlocks with previous initiators. There is no effect of 
interlock experience on guidance initiation.18 
   
6 Conclusion 
We examine whether social networks influence firm disclosure policies. We find that 
network ties via board interlocks increase the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation 
and that director-specific experience from prior quarterly earnings guidance cessation matters for 
disclosure policy contagion. We find that the positive director network effect on the likelihood of 
quarterly earnings guidance cessation is particularly strong for firms with stopper-interlocked 
directors who experienced positive consequences of stopping quarterly earnings guidance at the 
previous stoppers. 
We find that both audit committee directors and non-audit committee directors contribute 
to the contagion of guidance cessation. The influence of audit committee directors appears to be 
greater than that of non-audit committee directors, although the difference is not statistically 
significant. We obtain similar results if we examine audit committee chairs.  
Further analyses suggest that disclosure policy contagion is not caused by endogenous 
director-firm matching or strategic board stacking. Our results are robust to controlling for 
potential correlated omitted variables, such as geographical proximity, industry trends, and 
overlapping auditors, investors, and analysts. Following Stuart and Yim (2010), we exploit the 
sequence of events in the data to further address the endogenous director-firm matching caused 
by unobserved factors. The stopper interlock effect is robust even after controlling for director-
                                                 
18 The results utilizing a control sample of firms that issue quarterly earnings guidance in at least three out of the four 
quarters both in the pre- and post-event periods are similar. 
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firm matching and strategic board stacking. Overall, the evidence is consistent with our causal 
hypothesis that firm disclosure policies spread through social networks such as board interlocks. 
Our study contributes to the accounting and finance literature, as well as the social 
network literature, by demonstrating that board networks serve as conduits for information that 
influences corporate disclosure policies and that the interlocked directors’ outcome-specific 
experience affects policy contagion through shared directors. We also add to the voluntary 
disclosure literature by demonstrating that firm disclosure behavior is not only determined by 
firm and industry characteristics but also influenced by larger social structures. We show that 
knowledge and experience gained through director networks are important determinants of the 
quarterly earnings guidance cessation, an important change in firm disclosure policy. Our study 
can help investors and regulators better understand the mechanics behind voluntary disclosure 
changes. Future research should control for the effect of director interlocks when examining 
disclosure policy changes. Researchers should also consider that knowledge and experience that 
directors gain from other directorships might influence disclosure and other corporate policy 
changes. 
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Appendix Variable definitions 
 
Variable Description 
BHRET Market-adjusted buy-and-hold stock returns in the one-year period 
prior to the event quarter. 
∆PMBAF Change in the percentage of quarters for which the firm meets or 
beats consensus analyst forecasts in the pre-event period (quarters t-
4 to t-1, where quarter t is the event quarter) relative to the year prior 
to the pre-event period (quarters t-8 to t-5). 
∆STDret Change in the standard deviation of daily stock returns calculated 
over the pre-event period relative to the standard deviation of daily 
stock returns measured over the preceding 252 trading days. 
∆DISP Change in the analyst forecast dispersion, calculated as the standard 
deviation of the last analyst forecasts prior to quarter t-1 earnings 
announcement scaled by lagged stock price, relative to the same 
measure in quarter t-8.  
∆AF Change in analyst following, calculated as the change in the number 
of analysts covering the firm in quarter t-1 relative to the same 
measure in quarter t-8. 
∆PINST Change in the percentage of institutional ownership, calculated as 
the change in the percentage of shares held by institutional investors 
in quarter t-1 relative to quarter t-4. 
∆LTPINST Change in long-run institutional ownership, calculated as the 
difference in the aggregate percentage ownership held by dedicated 
investors and quasi-indexers in quarter t-1 relative to quarter t-4. 
LITIGATION Litigation risk, the estimated probability of being sued by 
shareholders, based on the litigation exposure model as in Tucker 
(2007) and Houston et al. (2010). 
MV Market value of equity at the end of the pre-event period in millions of 
dollars. We use LNMV, the natural logarithm of MV in probit regressions. 
MB Market-to-book ratio at the end of the pre-event period. We use 
LNMB, the natural logarithm of MB in probit regressions. 
LNCT The natural logarithm of one plus the number of management 
quarterly forecasts made through quarter t-1 in the CIG database. 
REGFD An indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s first management 
forecast on the CIG database occurs after the passage of Regulation FD.
CEO turnover An indicator variable that equals one if there is a change in CEO in the 
fiscal year prior to the event quarter. 
CFO turnover An indicator variable that equals one if there is a change in CFO in the 
fiscal year prior to the event quarter. 
Board size The number of directors on the board. 
Average board tenure The average number of years serving on the board. 
Average board age The average age of directors on the board. 
% of independent directors Percentage of independent directors on the board. 
CEO=Chairman An indicator variable that equals one if the CEO also serves as the 
chairman of the board. 
CEO ownership The percentage of CEO’s stock ownership. 
∆EPS The average change in diluted EPS in the four pre-event quarters 
relative to their respective last year same quarter values, deflated by 
the stock price at the beginning of the pre-event period. 
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FutureEPS The average change in diluted EPS from the four pre-event quarters 
to the four post-event quarters, deflated by the stock price at the 
beginning of the pre-event period. 
LOSS The proportion of loss-reporting quarters in the pre-event period. 
Positive ∆(forecast dispersion) An indicator variable that equals one if interlocked previous stoppers 
have experienced positive changes in forecast dispersion from the pre-
event quarters to the post-event quarters and zero otherwise. 
Positive ∆(forecast error) An indicator variable that equals one if interlocked previous stoppers 
have experienced positive changes in forecast error from the pre-
event quarters to the post-event quarters and zero otherwise. 
Negative ∆(analyst following) An indicator variable that equals one if interlocked previous stoppers 
have experienced negative changes in analyst from the pre-event 
quarters to the post-event quarters and zero otherwise. 
Positive ∆(return volatility) An indicator variable that equals one if interlocked previous stoppers 
have experienced positive changes in daily return volatility from the 
pre-event quarters to the post-event quarters and zero otherwise. 
Director-firm matching An indicator variable that equals one if a firm has a director who 
serves on the board of another company that stops providing 
quarterly earnings guidance at any point during our sample period 
and zero otherwise. 
Left director An indicator variable that equals one if any director of the firm 
departed from a guidance stopper’s board before the stopping event 
and zero otherwise. 
Tenure<=2yrs An indicator variable that equals one if the stopper-interlocked 
directors have a tenure of two years or less and zero otherwise. 
Migrated director An indicator variable that equals one if the director who triggers the 
stopper interlock joined the focal after the director’s guidance 
stopping experience and zero otherwise. 
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Figure 1 Board interlocks and timing of link activation 
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Table 1 Calendar year-quarter distribution of stoppers and maintainers 
 
Year Quarter # of 
stoppers 
# of 
stoppers 
with 
interlock
% of 
stoppers 
with 
interlock
# of 
maintainers
# of 
maintainers 
with 
interlock 
% of 
maintainers 
with 
interlock 
2002 1 9   29   
2002 2 4   17   
2002 3 4   35   
2002 4 7   19   
2003 1 8   16   
2003 2 16   14   
2003 3 7   22   
2003 4 5   28   
2004 1 5 3 60.0 32 1 3.1 
2004 2 5 1 20.0 30 5 16.7 
2004 3 4 2 50.0 30 7 23.3 
2004 4 3 1 33.3 34 5 14.7 
2005 1 11 4 36.4 21 1 4.8 
2005 2 10 1 10.0 22 2 9.1 
2005 3 7 1 14.3 31 2 6.5 
2005 4 5 2 40.0 29 5 17.2 
2006 1 13 5 38.5 34 4 11.8 
2006 2 10 2 20.0 27 7 25.9 
2006 3 6 4 66.7 26 3 11.5 
2006 4 11 4 36.4 22 1 4.5 
2007 1 8 3 37.5 25 3 12.0 
2007 2 7 1 14.3 26 5 19.2 
2007 3 4 1 25.0 26 1 3.8 
2007 4 9 2 22.2 21 4 19.0 
2008 1 17 5 29.4 22 2 9.1 
2008 2 9 1 11.1 21 3 14.3 
2008 3 3 0 0.0 23 4 17.4 
2008 4 8 2 25.0 25 3 12.0 
2009 1 22 3 13.6 24 3 12.5 
2009 2 7 2 28.6 25 1 4.0 
2009 3 2 0 0.0 30 4 13.3 
2009 4 1 0 0.0 20 1 5.0 
2010 1 3 2 66.7 40 1 2.5 
2010 2 1 0 0.0 36 1 2.8 
Total (2002/Q1-2010/Q2) 251     882     
Total (2004/Q1-2010/Q2) 191 52 27.2 702 79 11.3 
 
This table reports the distribution of our sample by calendar year-quarters. Stoppers are firms that issue 
quarterly earnings guidance for at least three out of four pre-event quarters but give no quarterly earnings 
guidance for the event quarter and three post-event quarters. Maintainers are firms that provide quarterly 
earnings guidance for at least three out of the four quarters in both the pre- and post-event periods. 
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Table 2 Summary statistics 
 
Panel A: Full sample descriptive statistics 
 
Variables N MEAN MEDIAN STD P25 P75 
Stopper 893 0.214 0.000 0.410 0.000 0.000 
Interlock 893 0.147 0.000 0.354 0.000 0.000 
BHRET 893 -0.025 -0.074 0.410 -0.299 0.156 
∆PMBAF 893 0.008 0.000 0.299 -0.250 0.250 
∆STDret 893 0.009 -0.080 1.127 -0.617 0.501 
∆DISP  893 0.015 0.000 0.103 0.000 0.037 
∆AF 893 0.826 1.000 3.320 -1.000 3.000 
∆PINST 893 5.037 3.112 17.283 -3.140 10.893 
∆LTPINST 893 0.029 0.025 0.140 -0.030 0.088 
LITIGATION 893 0.021 0.013 0.024 0.007 0.026 
MV 893 5,033 1,308 11,808 516 3,597 
MB 893 3.257 2.433 2.807 1.593 3.851 
LNCT 893 2.889 2.890 0.618 2.485 3.332 
REGFD 893 0.469 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
CEO turnover 893 0.031 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.000 
CFO turnover 893 0.041 0.000 0.199 0.000 0.000 
Board size 893 9.038 9.000 1.878 8.000 9.000 
Average board tenure 893 8.954 8.700 2.702 7.667 9.667 
Average board age 893 59.525 59.696 3.156 58.500 60.700 
% of independent directors 893 73.384 75.000 11.439 71.429 80.000 
CEO=Chairman 893 0.701 1.000 0.458 0.000 1.000 
CEO ownership (%) 893 2.246 1.188 4.125 0.844 1.736 
∆EPS 889 0.000 0.001 0.021 -0.004 0.004 
FutureEPS 887 0.000 0.001 0.022 -0.005 0.005 
LOSS 891 0.149 0.000 0.272 0.000 0.250 
∆(forecast dispersion) of 
interlock stoppers 131 -0.013 0.014 0.446 -0.023 0.082 
∆(forecast error) of interlock 
stoppers 131 -0.025 0.010 1.013 -0.040 0.107 
∆(analyst following) of 
interlock stoppers 131 -0.194 -0.250 1.887 -1.500 1.000 
∆(return volatility) of 
interlock stoppers 131 -0.001 -0.002 0.008 -0.005 0.002 
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Table 2 continued 
 
Panel B: Stoppers versus maintainers 
 
Variables (1) (2) (1)-(2) p-value   
  
Stopper 
(N=191) 
Maintainer 
(N=702)      
Interlock 0.272 0.113 0.160 <.0001 *** 
BHRET -0.112 -0.001 -0.111 <.0001 *** 
∆PMBAF -0.076 0.031 -0.107 <.0001 *** 
∆STDret 0.308 -0.073 0.381 <.0001 *** 
∆DISP  0.034 0.010 0.025 0.003 *** 
∆AF 0.325 0.963 -0.638 0.018 ** 
∆PINST 3.114 5.560 -2.446 0.059 * 
∆LTPINST 0.036 0.027 0.008 0.483  
LITIGATION 0.029 0.019 0.010 <.0001 *** 
MV 7,440 4,378 3,061 0.005 *** 
MB 3.385 3.222 0.163 0.516  
LNCT 3.101 2.831 0.270 <.0001 *** 
REGFD 0.361 0.499 -0.137 0.001 *** 
CEO turnover 0.047 0.027 0.020 0.227  
CFO turnover 0.052 0.038 0.014 0.434  
Board size 9.565 8.895 0.671 0.000 *** 
Average board tenure 9.223 8.880 0.343 0.195  
Average board age 59.855 59.435 0.420 0.158  
% of independent directors 73.922 73.238 0.684 0.521  
CEO=Chairman 0.581 0.734 -0.152 0.000 *** 
CEO ownership (%) 2.222 2.252 -0.030 0.930  
∆EPS -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.013 ** 
FutureEPS -0.005 0.002 -0.006 0.000 *** 
LOSS 0.109 0.159 -0.050 0.007 *** 
∆(forecast dispersion) of interlock stoppers -0.047 0.009 -0.056 0.488  
∆(forecast error) of interlock stoppers -0.054 -0.005 -0.050 0.785  
∆(analyst following) of interlock stoppers -0.183 -0.201 0.019 0.956  
∆(return volatility) of interlock stoppers -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.961  
 
The table presents summary statistics of our sample. We report the full sample statistics in Panel A and 
the means of stopper and maintainer subsamples in Panel B. Stopper is an indicator variable that equals 
one for firm-quarters if the firm stops providing quarterly earnings guidance in that calendar quarter and 
zero otherwise. Interlock is an indicator variable that equals one if any director of the firm served on the 
board of another company that has stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance at any point in the 
previous two years and zero otherwise. Among 191 stoppers, 52 are interlocked with previous stoppers. 
Among 702 maintainers, 79 are interlocked with previous stoppers. All other variables are defined in the 
appendix. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 Effect of board interlocks on the decision to stop quarterly earnings guidance 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Interlock  0.209*** 0.125*** 0.117*** 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) 
BHRET -0.171***  -0.169*** -0.159*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
∆EPS    -1.269 
    (0.151) 
FutureEPS    -1.650** 
    (0.015) 
LOSS    -0.038 
    (0.509) 
∆PMBAF -0.068  -0.072 -0.057 
 (0.154)  (0.114) (0.223) 
∆STDret -0.018  -0.027 -0.028 
 (0.444)  (0.222) (0.210) 
∆DISP  0.312**  0.313** 0.395*** 
 (0.027)  (0.022) (0.006) 
∆AF -0.007*  -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.091)  (0.146) (0.144) 
∆PINST -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.178)  (0.251) (0.264) 
∆LTPINST 0.107  0.109 0.088 
 (0.315)  (0.276) (0.368) 
LITIGATION 0.638  0.752 0.740 
 (0.321)  (0.225) (0.223) 
LNMV 0.044***  0.036*** 0.034*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001) (0.003) 
LNMB 0.008  0.005 0.015 
 (0.730)  (0.805) (0.494) 
LNCT 0.053**  0.043* 0.045* 
 (0.041)  (0.090) (0.074) 
REGFD -0.002  0.010 0.006 
 (0.957)  (0.717) (0.820) 
CEO turnover   0.158* 0.154* 
   (0.062) (0.063) 
CFO turnover   0.040 0.030 
   (0.538) (0.633) 
Board size   -0.068 -0.062 
   (0.328) (0.376) 
Average board tenure   0.005 0.004 
   (0.291) (0.376) 
Average director age   -0.000 0.001 
   (0.975) (0.893) 
% of independent directors   0.001 0.001 
   (0.351) (0.359) 
CEO=Chairman   -0.127*** -0.115*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
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CEO ownership   0.002 0.003 
   (0.449) (0.358) 
     
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 893 893 893 885 
Pseudo R-squared 0.199 0.134 0.234 0.244 
 
The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. The dependent variable, Stopper, is an indicator 
variable that equals one for firm-quarters if the firm stops providing quarterly earnings guidance in that 
calendar quarter and zero otherwise. We have 191 stoppers and 702 maintainers in our sample. Interlock 
is an indicator variable that equals one if any director of the firm served on the board of another company 
that stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance in the previous two years and zero otherwise. In our 
sample, 131 firms are interlocked with previous stoppers, and the remaining 762 firms are not 
interlocked with previous stoppers. All other variables are defined in the appendix. p-values are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4 Director-specific experience and board interlock effect 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Interlock 0.198*** 0.234*** 0.128** 0.102** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.015) (0.029) 
Interlock*Positive ∆(forecast dispersion) (N=79) -0.091**    
 (0.046)    
Interlock*Positive ∆(forecast error) (N=73)  -0.118***   
  (0.004)   
Interlock*Negative ∆(analyst following) (N=74)   -0.029  
   (0.591)  
Interlock*Positive ∆(return volatility) (N=44)    0.005 
    (0.929) 
BHRET -0.154*** -0.157*** -0.149*** -0.151*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
∆PMBAF -0.067 -0.069 -0.069 -0.069 
 (0.139) (0.128) (0.129) (0.129) 
∆STDret -0.025 -0.025 -0.026 -0.026 
 (0.272) (0.286) (0.262) (0.261) 
∆DISP  0.315** 0.314** 0.328** 0.324** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) 
∆AF -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* 
 (0.099) (0.064) (0.090) (0.090) 
∆PINST -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.190) (0.266) (0.205) (0.206) 
∆LTPINST 0.135 0.111 0.132 0.130 
 (0.177) (0.272) (0.191) (0.199) 
LITIGATION 1.125* 1.063* 1.049* 1.019 
 (0.074) (0.093) (0.099) (0.107) 
LNMV 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LNMB -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.706) (0.785) (0.706) (0.691) 
LNCT 0.033 0.029 0.031 0.030 
 (0.156) (0.224) (0.188) (0.199) 
REGFD 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.945) (0.952) (0.991) (0.960) 
CEO turnover 0.115 0.113 0.120 0.120 
 (0.153) (0.162) (0.129) (0.132) 
CFO turnover 0.043 0.052 0.047 0.048 
 (0.512) (0.431) (0.477) (0.470) 
Board size -0.058 -0.056 -0.065 -0.067 
 (0.389) (0.400) (0.334) (0.316) 
Average board tenure 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.185) (0.215) (0.212) (0.224) 
Average director age -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.888) (0.991) (0.983) (0.989) 
% of independent directors 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.221) (0.228) (0.296) (0.306) 
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CEO=Chairman -0.118*** -0.119*** -0.118*** -0.117*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO ownership 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.424) (0.391) (0.445) (0.453) 
     
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 893 893 893 893 
Pseudo R-squared 0.213 0.219 0.209 0.209 
 
The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. The dependent variable, Stopper, is an indicator 
variable that equals one for firm-quarters if the firm stops providing quarterly earnings guidance in that 
calendar quarter and zero otherwise. Interlock is an indicator variable that equals one if any director of the 
firm served on the board of another company that stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance in the 
previous two years and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in the appendix. p-values are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 5 Effect of interlocks through different types of directors on the decision to stop quarterly 
earnings guidance 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Interlock through focal firm’s audit committee 
members (N=51) 0.155**    
 (0.012)    
Interlock through focal firm’s non-audit 
committee members (N=80) 0.113**    
 (0.028)    
Interlock through focal firm’s audit committee 
chair (N=13)  0.276**   
  (0.027)   
Interlock through focal firm’s non-audit 
committee chair (N=118)  0.110***   
  (0.009)   
Interlock through previous stopper’s audit 
committee members (N=61)   0.149***  
   (0.009)  
Interlock through previous stopper’s non-audit 
committee members (N=70)   0.110**  
   (0.036)  
Interlock through previous stopper’s audit 
committee chair (N=21)    0.204** 
    (0.036) 
Interlock through previous stopper’s non-audit 
committee chair (N=110)    0.112** 
    (0.010) 
BHRET -0.169*** -0.172*** -0.169*** -0.167*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆PMBAF -0.070 -0.069 -0.072 -0.072 
 (0.127) (0.133) (0.116) (0.116) 
∆STDret -0.027 -0.028 -0.027 -0.026 
 (0.225) (0.212) (0.235) (0.254) 
∆DISP  0.313** 0.312** 0.312** 0.313** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) 
∆AF -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.138) (0.129) (0.148) (0.131) 
∆PINST -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.258) (0.256) (0.258) (0.244) 
∆LTPINST 0.106 0.103 0.108 0.112 
 (0.290) (0.302) (0.281) (0.262) 
LITIGATION 0.778 0.775 0.758 0.764 
 (0.209) (0.211) (0.218) (0.216) 
LNMV 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LNMB 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 
 (0.834) (0.765) (0.804) (0.807) 
LNCT 0.043* 0.043* 0.043* 0.044* 
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 (0.090) (0.088) (0.088) (0.085) 
REGFD 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.012 
 (0.678) (0.667) (0.704) (0.671) 
CEO turnover 0.156* 0.154* 0.157* 0.161* 
 (0.064) (0.068) (0.063) (0.057) 
CFO turnover 0.038 0.040 0.038 0.040 
 (0.555) (0.537) (0.552) (0.531) 
Board size -0.064 -0.062 -0.068 -0.064 
 (0.361) (0.373) (0.329) (0.357) 
Average board tenure 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.278) (0.264) (0.290) (0.274) 
Average director age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.968) (0.989) (0.966) (0.972) 
% of independent directors 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.333) (0.318) (0.341) (0.328) 
CEO=Chairman -0.126*** -0.127*** -0.128*** -0.127*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO ownership 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.440) (0.427) (0.454) (0.438) 
     
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 893 893 893 893 
Pseudo R-squared 0.235 0.236 0.235 0.235 
Chi-square difference test 0.221 1.213 0.222 0.535 
p-value 0.638 0.271 0.638 0.464 
 
The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. The dependent variable, Stopper, is an indicator 
variable that equals one for firm-quarters if the firm stops providing quarterly earnings guidance in that 
calendar quarter and zero otherwise. Interlock through focal firm’s audit committee members is an indicator 
variable that equals one if any stopper-interlocked director is an audit committee member of the firm and zero 
otherwise, where a stopper interlocked-director is a director who served on the board of another company that 
stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance in the previous two years (previous stopper). Interlock through 
focal firm’s non-audit committee members is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has a stopper-
interlocked director but no stopper-interlocked director is an audit committee member of the firm and zero 
otherwise. Interlock through focal firm’s audit committee chair is an indicator variable that equals one if any 
stopper interlocked director is the audit committee chair of the firm and zero otherwise. Interlock through focal 
firm’s non-audit committee chair is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has a stopper-interlocked 
director but no stopper-interlocked director is the audit committee chair of the firm and zero otherwise. 
Interlock through previous stopper’s audit committee members is an indicator variable that equals one if any 
stopper-interlocked director was an audit committee member of previous stoppers and zero otherwise. 
Interlock through previous stopper’s non-audit committee members is an indicator variable that equals one if 
the firm has a stopper-interlocked director but no stopper-interlocked director was an audit committee member 
of previous stoppers and zero otherwise. Interlock through previous stopper’s audit committee chair is an 
indicator variable that equals one if any stopper-interlocked director was an audit committee chair of previous 
stoppers and zero otherwise. Interlock through previous stopper’s non-audit committee chair is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the firm has a stopper-interlocked director but no stopper-interlocked director was an 
audit committee chair of previous stoppers and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in the appendix. 
p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, 
respectively. 
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 Table 6 Board interlock effect and the timing of link activation 
 
  (1) (2) 
Interlock 0.154*** 0.115*** 
 (0.000) (0.007) 
Director-firm matching (N=582) -0.081***  
 (0.003)  
Left director (N=113)  0.034 
  (0.366) 
   
Control variables Included Included 
   
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
Observations 893 893 
Pseudo R-squared 0.241 0.235 
 
The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. The dependent variable, Stopper, is an indicator 
variable that equals one for firm-quarters if the firm stops providing quarterly earnings guidance in that 
calendar quarter and zero otherwise. Interlock is an indicator variable that equals one if any director of the 
firm served on the board of another company that stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance in the 
previous two years and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in the appendix. p-values are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 7 Board interlock effect and director tenure: test of board stacking 
 
  (1) (2) 
Interlock 0.104** 0.118*** 
 (0.016) (0.004) 
Interlock*Tenure <=2yrs (N=23) 0.095  
 (0.290)  
Interlock*Migrated director (N=3)  0.330 
  (0.129) 
   
Control variables Included Included 
   
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
Observations 893 893 
Pseudo R-squared 0.236 0.236 
 
The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. The dependent variable, Stopper, is an indicator 
variable that equals one for firm-quarters if the firm stops providing quarterly earnings guidance in that 
calendar quarter and zero otherwise. Interlock is an indicator variable that equals one if any director of the 
firm served on the board of another company that stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance at any 
point in the previous two years and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in the appendix. p-
values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
